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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
-vs- ) 
GEORGE OLIVER DUMAS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
Case No. 14176 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was a criminal action brought by the State 
of Utah against defendant-appellant George Oliver Dumas charging 
him with aggravated robbery, a felony in the First Degree, 
in violation of 76-6-302, Utah Code Annot, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, on June 12th, 1975 the jury found the 
appellant guilty of attempted aggravated robbery, a lesser 
included offense to the offense charged. Subsequently, appellant 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to 
fifteen years as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing his 
conviction and quashing the Information filed herein, or in 
the alternative, remanding the case to the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court for a new trial consistent* with the rulings of this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Information charged appellant George Oliver Dumas 
with having robbed Robert Allen Haynes and Richard DeLucia by 
the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm on or about Febru-
ary 19, 19 75 in Salt Lake County, Utah. In support of its charge 
the State introduced the following witnesses and evidence. 
Claude Aaron Parks testified that he was released 
from Leavenworth Penitentiary on February 18, 19 75 and that 
he boarded a bus bound for Washington (T.16)*. While on the 
bus he met the victims of the alleged robbery Robert Haynes 
and Richard DeLucia (T.16). During the course of their journey 
they produced some quantities of illegal drugs (T.17). After 
having partaken of a modest quantity of these drugs, the trio 
arrived at Salt Lake City sometime on the evening of February 
19th. Parks testified that when he reached Salt Lake he phoned 
Gail Boone, with whom he had served time at the Utah State Prison 
* Hereinafter "T" designations shall refer to the Transcript 
of Trial Proceedings. 
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(T.18), and arranged to meet Boone at the Salt Palace in Salt 
Lake City (T.19). Subsequently, Boone arrived and a meeting 
occured in the parking lot of the Salt Palace at which Parks 
told Boone of the narcotics in the hands of Haynes and DeLucia, 
(T.21), trading the information for a change of clothes and 
a plane ticket to Washington. Subsequently a second meeting 
was held in the parking lot of the Salt Palace between Parks, 
Boone, and defendant-appellant Dumas (T.23). At this meeting 
no reference was made to plans to rob Haynes and DeLucia (T.24*26). 
Thereafter Parks proceeded back to the Greyhound Bus Terminal. 
A meeting of several individuals including Gail Boonei George 
Dumas, Richard Ronald Nielson, and two other individuals, 
together with Claude Parks occurred in the restroom of the bus 
depot during which reference to Haynes1 and DeLucia's possession 
of narcotics was made (T.28). Parks indicated that he would 
try to get Haynes and DeLucia outside on the street (T.30) and 
he "thinks" Dumas indicated that he and some others would ffget 
into position" (T.31). Subsequently, Parks did entice Haynes 
and DeLucia to the street. When they got outside, Nielson was 
seven or eight feet from their position and Dumas was some 
fifteen feet up the street (T.33). After trying to talk Haynes 
and DeLucia out of the drugs, Parks motioned to Nielson who 
accosted Haynes and DeLucia and pulled a rifle from under his 
coat (T.36). Dumas apparently remained standing in the same 
position. He testified that Nielson hit DeLucia on the head 
with the stock of a sawed-off rifle (T.38) and that he (Parks) 
got into a struggle over the weapon which developed between 
Nielson and DeLucia (T.38). Parks apparently succeeded in 
getting the gun away whereupon he ran, with the gun, to the 
Salt Palace (T.39). Parks also testified that a red Pantera 
automobile (which subsequently proven to belong to defendant 
Dumas) was parked nearby, adjacent to the sidewalk (T.40). He 
testified that he later met Boone at the Salt Palace and they 
disposed of the gun in a trash can (T.41-43). Parks testified 
that he was subsequently accosted by some policemen and arrested 
(T.44-46). 
Jeff McCullin, a bus passenger, testified to having 
seen the red Pantera parked in front of the bus depot. He 
did not see the individuals park or alight from the car (Vol.11 T 
He also saw four "muscular" individuals none of whom he could 
identify, walk into the bus station (Vol.11 T.18). He went 
outside and saw one person running to the right and another 
running toward the Salt Palace. He could not identify these 
individuals (Vol.11 T.17). 
Teddy Klassen testified to being at the bus depot 
in the company of Mr. McCullin and a girl (Vol.11 T.19). He 
corroborated the presence of the red Pantera in front of the 
bus depot and stated that he walked outside after it arrived 
(T.20). He also saw three muscular individuals apparently 
in the vicinity of the bus depot (Vol.11 T.21). He saw a heavy 
set individual running toward the Salt Palace with a long object 
in his hand (Vol.11 T.22). Thereafter several policemen arrived 
(Vol.11 T.22). 
The State then called Robert Allen Haynes, one of 
the purported victims (Vol.11 T.25) who indicated that he made 
a bus trip to Salt Lake City carrying a suitcase (Exhibit 3) 
containing some drugs including marijuana, cocaine, and quailude 
(Vol.11 T.27-28). He acknowledged having become acquainted 
with Mr. Parks on the bus (Vol.11 T.28),and giving him a small 
quantity of drugs (Vol.11 T.29). He also stated that when 
he arrived in Salt Lake sometime around 6:00 o'clock he had 
some $2000 in his possession (Vol.II T.30)• While in the bus 
depot Mr. Parks accosted him indicating that he wanted to buy 
some cocaine. Haynes declined, an argument ensued, and he, 
Parks, and DeLucia went out the door of the bus depot (Vol.11 
T.32). Outside, adjacent to the front door of the depot, 
Parks indicated that if they did not give him the cocaine he 
would take it from them. Thereupon, according to Haynes, two 
men approached from the left at a rapid rate. One of the men 
pushed him and ordered him not to move, indicating that he 
had a gun. The man on the right pulled a short .22 rifle from 
under his coat and threatened Haynes with it. Haynes grabbed 
the barrel, a struggel ensued in which Parks involved himself, 
and as a result the gun fell to the ground (Vol.11 T.33-38). 
During the struggle Haynes received an injury to his head. He 
thought he had been shot, but it is more likely that he was struck. 
After the struggle Parks picked up the gun and ran across the 
street (Vol.11 T.38) and both of the victims ran toward the rear 
of the terminal. The witness identified the assailants as appel-
lant and Richard Ronald Nielson (Vol.II T,40). As the victims 
fled down the alley Haynes observed that Nielson was chasing 
them. Haynes went into the bus station through the garage area, 
concerned mainly about having his injury treated (Vol.11 T.42). 
His testimony was absent any indication that anything was taken 
from him in the course of the incident. 
John C. Davis, a Salt Lake City Police Officer, testi-
fied that he impounded a red Pantera registered to appellant 
in front of the Greyhound Bus depot on the evening in question 
(Vol.11 T.94). 
The State then called Richard DeLucia, the other vicim 
of the alleged robbery. DeLucia corroborated most of the events 
prior to the robbery itself, which he stated occurred between 
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. (Vol. II T.98-103). His description of the 
robbery itself corroborated that of Mr. Haynes. Additionally, 
he testified that the two alleged robbers came from the direction 
of the Pantera. He corroborated Haynes1 testimony that the gun 
wielding assailant was appellant Dumas. He stated that he did 
not hear a shot fired (Vol.11 T.108). He said that during the 
scuffle he jumped on Nielson!s back, and that after the scuffle 
he ran to the parking lot of the Salt Palace. He said that Niel-
son pursued him, caught him, and pushed him to the ground (Vol.11 
T.110). At this time a white Chevrolet automobile drove up 
containing two other individuals (neither of whom was appellant), 
one of whom got out of the car and bound and gagged him with 
white surgical tape (Vol.11 T.110-111). Whereupon, he identified 
Nielson as the man who removed money from his person and kicked 
him in the eye (Vol.11 T.112-114). 
Kenneth Thirsk, a Salt Lake City narcotics officer, 
identified a quantity of money delivered to him by Haynes and 
a suitcase containing the drugs which Haynes and DeLucia had 
transported from New York, which were admitted into evidence. 
Office John Foster, a Salt Lake City Policeman testified 
that he was the initial investigating officer of the alleged 
robbery. He stated that he talked to DeLucia who indicated that 
the only item taken from him had been a locker key (Vol.Ill T.24). 
DeLucia apparently related the details of the incident to him. 
He testified that subsequently on the same evening he saw the 
appellant Dumas in the custody of Officers Humphreys and Rackley 
who had returned Dumas to the bus depot. At the time seen by 
Officer Foster, the appellant was wearing a v-neck pull-over 
and a pendant around his neck (Vol.Ill T.28). He did not see 
whether or not he was wearing additional jewelry because he did 
not see his hands (Vol.Ill T.28). Officer Rackley testified 
that he had arrested appellant at the Salt Palace sometime after 
the robbery had occurred (Vol.Ill T.10). 
John Johnson, a Salt Lake City Police Detective, ad-
mitted that the victims, when initially relating the details 
of the robbery to him, indicated that only one assailant approach-
ed and that they did not know which of the assailants had the 
gun (Vol.Ill T.44). 
On behalf of defendant Nielson, several witnesses were 
called to testify that between 7:30 and 8:30 he was engaged in 
a conversation with one Cindy Jordan, and that subsequently, 
near 9:00 he was seen at Ceasar's Lounge in Murray (Vol.Ill T.67-
89). On behalf of defendant Dumas, Roger Jones, the Salt Lake 
City jailer introduced a booking slip which indicated that when 
booked Mr. Dumas was in possession of a large quantity of tur-
quoise jewelry (Vol.Ill T.98). 
Teddy Klassen was recalled and testified that when 
he saw Mr. Dumas at the bus depot he was not wearing a trench 
coat (Vol.Ill T.103). He also testified that he saw a light 
gray Chevrolet automobile in the front of the bus depot at or 
about the time of the robbery, 
Claude Parks was recalled and testified that there 
was no conversation concerning the robbery at the time he met 
Mr. Dumas in the parking lot at the Salt Palace in the company 
of Mr. Boone (Vol.Ill T.lll); that at no time in the evening 
in question did he see Mr. Dumas wearing a trench coat (Vol.Ill 
T.116); and that Mr. Dumas and the other individuals with whom 
he had been seen in the lavatory of the bus depot were down the 
street at the time the robbery incident occurred (Vol,III T.116). 
He reiterated the fact that only himself and Nielson were directly 
involved in accosting the victims (Vol.Ill T.127). 
ARGUMENT 
PREFATORY NOTE TO ARGUMENT 
Three aspects of the State?s presentation of this case 
cast a deep shadow over proper resolution of the factual issues 
raised. Because of the overriding nature and persistent effect 
of these factors, appellant urges the Court to bear them in mind 
as it reads and considers the individual issues presented by this 
appeal. 
First, appellant was tried in a joint trial with co-
defendant Richard Ronald Nielson, whose defenses were in such 
substantial conflict with those adduced by appellant as to sub-
stantially inpede appellant's right to defend the allegations 
of the Information and fairly rebut the evidence against him. 
See pp. 30 through 31, supra. 
Second, the State introduced evidence against the de-
fendant which was internally inconsistent, with the result that 
he was forced to defend what were essentially two separate crimes 
based on entirely separate acts. Haynes and DeLucia (pp. 5 and 
6, supra) testified that appellant accosted them as a direct 
participant in an attempted robbery. Claude Aaron Parks testi-
fied that appellant had not directly participated in the robbery 
but had merely been present when comments were made about the 
fact that the robbery was going to occur (p.3, supra). 
Third, is the fact that the State in its argument to 
the jury (supported by the instructions by the Court) encouraged 
the jury to find appellant guilty under one of two separate theor 
of criminal culpability, to-wit: either as a direct participant, 
or as an f faider and abettor11 as defined by the laws of the Sta te 
of Utah. 
I 
THE EVIDENCE AS TO APPELLANT IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT 
The thrust of the State's rather ambiguous allegations 
as to the conduct of appellant as it related to the robbery are 
summarized by the, prosecutor at Vol.IV T.15. 
What about Mr. Dumas1 participation in 
the crime? DeLucia and Haynes said he had the 
J gun. Parks said he didn't. What difference 
does it make? The Court instructed you in the 
instruction ... with regard to principals. 
I It is not just two guys going in to rob a bank. 
Now, the two guys go in to rob it and they have 
a third man driving a get away car. They go 
in and take the property by means of force and 
fear. They are not the only ones going to be 
responsible. Also responsible is the man out-
side, although, as a factual matter, he didn't 
go and take the funds by force and fear. You 
are talking about "principal11*. It is not the 
person that directly commits the offense. Any-
one who aids, intentionally aids, encourages, 
solicites, commands .. read the instruction. 
The commission of that offense, not everyone 
in this offense got involved in the struggle, 
.'Whether it was Mr. Nielson or Mr. Dumas, that 
is for you to decide which one. What difference 
does it make who had the gun? They were both 
there, responsible for each others conduct. 
Give that some thought. Was Mr. Dumas involved 
or wasn't he? 
Appellant finds fault with two aspects of this argument. The 
first one is that "involvement11 is not necessarily a crime. 
The second is that it does make a substantial difference who 
had the gun and v/ho directly participated in the robbery in light 
of the fact that if direct participation was not performed by 
Dumas, some act must be shown to have been committed by him which 
was integrally related to the substance of the offense. 
The State did not directly contend that Dumas actually 
had the weapon or actually accosted the victims despite the fact 
that two of its star witnesses so testified. Thus, attention 
is now directed to the alternative theory of guilt asserted 
against Mr. Dumas which was that he was a "aider and abettor" 
of other principals in the offense. 
Controlling Utah authority on the meaning of "aiding 
and abetting" is found in State v. Laub, 102 U.402, 131 P.2d 
805 and State v. Johnson, 6 U.2d 29, 305 P.2d 488. An examination 
of these opinions is instructive in light of the facts of this 
case. 
In Laub, supra, four individuals were present on a 
cattle range, Witnesses saw three of the men merging from the 
woods covered with blood. The fourth man was standing near a 
vehicle. It was demonstrated that a calf had been recently 
slaughtered in the same area, and that one or more of the four 
defendants had been in possession of a beef carcass. There was 
evidence that certain of the individuals made inconsistent ex-
planations to witnesses of the circumstances of the case. The 
Court held that circumstantial evidence against three of the 
four defendants was sufficient to justify conviction. In re-
versing the conviction of the fourth defendant the Court said: 
Cannon however, is in a different position. 
He was not with the other three defendants 
when they came from the woods. He did not have 
any blood on him, nor did he stay with the other 
defendants so that the court or jury could infer 
that he helped bring the carcass to the truck. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that he went 
with the Trumans to help them load their wood 
and did not rejoin the other defendants until 
they were ready to leave for home. The only 
evidence which points to his guilt is that he 
made false statements about trading pine nuts 
for the meat in Nevada and he took part of 
the meat. This is not sufficient evidence to 
uphold his conviction. This is not a charge 
of conspiracy and there is no evidence that 
he in any way aided in or planned the commis-
sion of the crime. 
In Johnson, supra, defendant was observed looking in 
a store window when his companion was inside committing a burglary. 
He was then seen walking rapidly towards the rear of the building. 
There was evidence that defendant hid a ladder which his companion 
had used to gain entrance and was acting as a look-out for the 
companion. This court concluded that from the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom a jury was justified in finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of aiding 
and abetting his confederate in the burglary. In so holding, 
the court specifically relied upon the presence of direct affirma-
tive evidence that defendant had performed acts which materially 
aided the confederate to commit the burglary, particularly in 
hiding the ladder which was used by the confederate in gaining 
entry to the store, and the inference that he was acting as a 
look-out* 
The concensus of these Utah cases is that the State 
must show evidence of affirmative verbal or physical conduct 
integrally related to the direct commission of the offense in 
order to sustain a conviction for "aiding and abetting," Such 
a consensus would be consistent with the holdings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and those of iftost of the Courts of 
Appeals related to this issue. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that one must consciously share in the criminal act in order to 
be a principal, whether an aider or abettor, or otherwise. Pereira 
v. U.S., 347 U.S. 1, 98 L.Ed. 435, 74 S.Ct. 358; and further that 
one is an accomplice ffif with purpose of promoting or facilitating 
the crime, he ... substantially facilitates its commission,11 
Scales v. U.S. , 367 U.S. 203, 6 L,Ed.2d 782, 81 S.Ct. 1469, re-
hearing den., 360 U.S. 978, 6 L.Ed. 2d 12^7, 81 S.Ct. 1912. The 
Second Circuit has held that the mere fact that one is in the 
company of another who commits a crime is not sufficient to estab-
lish aiding and abetting. U.S. v. Garguilo, 312 F.2d 249 (2d 
Cir. 1962). In that case the Circuit additionally held that 
knov/ledge that a crime is being committed even when coupled with 
presence of the scene is generally not enough to constitute aiding 
and abetting. The Tenth Circuit has held that active assistance 
is required to justify a conviction for aiding and abetting. 
White v. U.S., 366 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1966) ; and additionally 
held that mere presence at the scene is not sufficient, King 
v. U.S., 402 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1968). The driving of a get 
away car has consistently been held to be sufficient, see e.g. 
U.S. v. Young, 468 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, denied 414 
U.S. 849, 38 L.Ed.2d 97, 94 S.Ct. 139, as has active participation 
as a look-out. See e.g. Johnson, supra. 
A plethora of cases hold that a mere presence at the 
scene of a crime is insufficient to justify a conviction for aiding 
and abetting. Snyder V. U.S., 448 F.2d 716 (C.A. N.D. 1971); 
U.S. v. Joiner, 429 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Holt, 427 
F.2d 1114 (C.A. Mo. 1970). In dictum the United States Supreme 
Court has held that "aiding and abetting means to assist the 
perpetrator of the crime (citing Hitch v. United States, 150 U.S. 
442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 and United States v. PiRe, 332 
U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed.'210)for the proposition that 
presence at the scene of a crime is not evidence of guilt as an 
aider and abettor". U.S. v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 95 L.Ed.747, 
71 S.Ct.595. Perhaps the best synthesis of all of this is found 
in Long v. U.S., 360 F.2d 829 (1966) in which the District of 
Columbia's Circuit stated that mere presence at the scene is enough 
only if it is "intended to and does aid the primary actors". 
Similarly, see U.S. v. Moses, 122 F.Supp. 523 (D.G. Penn. 1954) 
in which the Pennsylvania United States District Court held that 
"aiding and abetting" implies and requires some conduct of an 
affirmative nature, and mere negative acquiesence is not sufficient. 
Of similar import is the instruction given to the jury 
in this case which is consistent with Sec. 76-2-202; obviously 
given in contemplation of the possibility that the jury may not 
have believed that appellant directly participated in the robbery: 
Criminal responsibility for direct commis-
sion o"? offense or for conduct of another. -
Every person, acting with a mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicites, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which consti-
tutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
This statutes is consistent with the case law in requiring direct 
and affirmative verbal or physical conduct as a precondition 
to convicition. Two aspects of the statute require physical 
acts, to-wit: those who directly commit a crime or "aid" another 
to engage in conduct which constitute and offense. The balance 
of the section relates to verbal conduct which can make one liable 
as a party for the commission of crime. Inasmuch as there was 
no allegation of verbal conduct of the sort described in Sec. 
76-2-202, no further consideration thereof is required in this 
case. An examination of the conduct.of the appellant in light 
of the language of the statute and the case holdings under which 
it must be construed demonstrate that his conviction as an "aider 
and abettor" cannot be upheld. ; 
• • • • • ' • i 
The State relies on the following facts to demonstrate 
that Dumas was an "principal in this offense", excluding its 
-15-
contradictory allegations that he directly involved himself in 
the robbery. 
1. His Pantera automobile was outside the 
bus depot with Mr. Parks1 coat in it (Vol.IV T.6). 
2. Parks saw Dumas in the parking lot of the 
Salt Palace in the company of Gale Boone, at which 
time no conversation concerning a robbery occurred 
(Vol.IV T.6). 
3. Dumas was present in front of the bus depot 
standing some distance away when the robbery occurred 
( according to Mr. Parks)(Vol.IV T.11). 
4* Dumas left his car sitting in front of the 
bus depot after the robbery with the keys in it (Vol.IV 
T.16). 
5. Mr. Dumas1 presence in the bathroom of the 
bus depot during a period of time when the robbery 
was being discussed (Vol.IV T.65), coupled with the 
fact that Mr. Dumas did not disavow any of that con-
versation according to the evidence. 
6. The State then alleged that Dumas had "planned 
the robbery11 (Vol. IV T.66). There was no direct evi-
dence of this whatsoever. 
All of the foregoing is circumstantial. It does show 
that appellant was present when the robbery occurred and there 
is an indication that he may have known that it was going to 
occur. Nonetheless, the cases hold that those two facts, even 
when coupled together, are insufficient to constitute proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence of an 
act integrally related to or required to faciliate the robbery 
is absent. Failing such proof, the State asked the jury to 
speculate that Mr. Dumas participated in planning the robbery 
which, under the cases would make him an aider and abettor if 
his actions constituted active encouragement (Vol.IV T.65). 
Nonetheless, Mr. Parks, the only witness to the conversations 
which led up to the robbery, testified that Mr. Dumas did not 
participate in planning the robbery, and that at best he may 
have made one statement in the lavatory of the bus depot. Since 
Mr. Parks was not sure who had made the statement it cannot con-
stitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant's complicity. 
The sum of the legitimate inferences from the circum-
stantial evidence is not so conclusive as to preclude hypotheses 
or explanations inconsistent with his innocence. The evidence 
in this case is more like the evidence in the Laub cage against 
the defendant whose conviction was reversed than it is similar 
to that against the defendant in the Johnson case. The State must 
prove a criminal act to sustain a conviction, State v. Bassett, 
27 U.2d 272, 495 P.2d 318 (1972).Here, there was no evidence 
of aiding and abetting by direct or indirect participation. 
The best the State could even contend would be a very obtuse 
inference that Dumas was a look-out for the robbery; made insuf-
ficient by Parks1 testimony which does not even suffice to show 
that Dumas was there during the entire course of the criminal per-
formance. The evidence of "aiding and abetting11 is totally 
insufficient, and to sustain his conviction based thereon is 
to render the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard a sham and to 
deny due process in contravention of the law of the State of 
Utah. 
.' II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
At trial appellant requested the Court to give the 
following jury instruction, designated Defendant's Proposed Jury 
Instruction No. 2. 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant 
the evidence must, to your minds, exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the 
guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if 
after an entire consideration of and comparison 
of all the testimony in the case, you can reason-
ably explain the facts given in evidence on 
any reasonable ground other than the guilt 
of the defendant, you must acquit him. 
The Court refused to give this instruction which embodies what 
is known as ftHodge's Rule" on the ground that such instructions 
are required only in cases where all of the evidence of defen-
dant's guilt is circumstantial. Proper exception to the Court's 
failure to give this instruction was made by the defense at Vol.IV 
T.71. 
The Court's statement of the law is correct, that is; 
the "reasonable hypothesis1' instruction is applicable only to 
circumstantial cases. See e.g. State v. Garcia, 11 U.2d 67, 
355 P.2d 57 (1960), wherein this court said: 
... it is universally recognized that there 
is no jury question without substantial evidence 
indicating defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This requires evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find defendant guilty 
of all material issues of fact beyond a reason-
able doubt. In applying this rule, usually 
with reference to the jury instructions, we 
have held that where the only proof of material 
fact or one which is a necessary element of 
defendant's guilt consisted of circumstantial 
evidence, such circumstances must reasonably 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of defen-
dant's innocence* (Quoting State v. Irwin, 
101 U.365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. 
Burch, 100 U.414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941); State 
v. Laub, 102 U.402, 131 P.2d 805 (1942)"T?tarte 
v. Anderson, 108 U.130, 158 P.2d 127, 159 ALR 
340(1945); State yy Crawford, 59 U.39, 201 
P.130 (19 21JTTeopTe W Scott, 10 U.217, 37 
P.335 (1894)). 
The trial Court's error in this case was not one of law, but 
one of application of that law to the facts of the case. 
Evidence was adduced by the State from which the jury 
could conceivably have found defendant guilty on two separate 
theories: first, that he accosted the victims, drew a weapon, 
assaulted one of the victims, and attempted to rob him; and 
second, that he was guilty by reason of his having been present 
when the robbery was planned and executed, from which an inference 
could have been drawn that he was an aider and abettor by planning 
or encouragement or that he acted as a look-out. As to the first 
theory, all of the evidence was direct, and thus the Hodge's 
Rule instruction would be inappropriate. As to the second theory 
however, all of the evidence was circumstantial, consisting solely 
on the facts set forth at p. 16 supra. The jury verdict in this 
case did not require specification of the theory upon which guilt 
was found. We have no way of knowing the particular facts upon 
which the jury relied to find defendant's guilt. 
In such circumstances the general rule is as follows: 
In order to sustain a general verdict 
of guilty where the case has been submitted 
to the jury under two distinct theories as 
to the guilt of the accused, the evidence must 
be sufficient to sustain a conviction upon 
either. 30 Am.Jur.2d "Evidence", Sec. 1124, 
Vol. 30 p.292, citing People v. Sullivan, 
173 N.Y. 122, 65 N,E.980. V 
As indicated above, the evidence that appellant was guilty as 
an aider and abettor is insufficient to sustain the verdict. Furth 
more, the failure to give the Hodge's Rule instruction requested 
by defendant as to the aiding and abetting theory of the case 
poses a substantial likelihood that the jury found his guilt 
on that theory not only with insufficient evidence, but without 
the benefit of a proper instruction. 
A similar circumstance was faced by this Court in 
State v. Pacheco, 27 U.2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1972). There 
defendant was charged, apparently by a short form Information, 
with the crime of grand larceny of a rifle. Though there was 
circumstantial evidence that Pacheco himself may have perpetrated 
the burglary, there was also evidence that he may have acted as 
an aider and abettor of his brother. After the latter evidence 
was in, the trial court, over objection, gratuitously instructed 
the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting. In reversing the 
conviction this Court said at 492 P.2d 1348. 
This man is entitled to a new trial since it 
is impossible for this court to prestidigitate 
whether the jury convicted the defendant of 
larceny or aiding and abetting, under the record 
in this case. We cannot enjoy the luxury or 
humiliation in this county to sustain the con-
viction of a man on trite aphorism unsupported 
by any kind of evidence. 
The dissent says that there is no such 
crime as aiding and abetting. Not so. To 
convict for aiding and abetting, under Title 
76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953 the State must prove first 
that some other person, - in this case appel-
lant's brother, Bob - committed the offense. 
No effort was made by the State so to do, and 
so far as this record is concerned Bob or any-
one else has never been charged with the of-
fense. ... 
Though the facts presented by the Pacheco case are not in point, 
the legal theory is, and should be applied to this case. Appel-
lant Dumas, by motion for bill of particulars, requested the State 
to set forth the acts upon which it intended to rely in proving 
his guilt. The trial court refused to require the State to dis-
close these facts. It was this action by the trial court that 
made it unnecessary for the State to elect the theory upon which 
it would proceed prior to trial, and which permitted it to intro-
duce entirely contradictory evidence related to the defendant. 
Here, as in Pacheco, it is impossible to determine which theory 
it was upon which the jury convicted. In Pacheco the difficulty 
was that they had failed to prove that someone else had performed 
the burglary which was viewed by this court to be a precondition 
to an aiding and abetting conviction against Pacheco. In this 
case, the State proved no act or conduct of the defendant which 
could have constituted aiding and abetting. Both failures are 
fatal to the convictions. The legal posture of these cases is 
identical. Due process has been violated with the result that 
this Court should under its holding in Pachecoy supra, grant appel-
lant a new trial at which the State should be required to make 
an election as to how it wishes to proceed. If it proceeds on 
a theory of aiding and abetting, the ,freasonable alternative hy-
pothesis11 instruction should be required. 
Ill 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT A SEPAR-
ATE TRIAL 
Appellant was charged by Information, Case No. 2 7644, 
filed March 27, 1975. Co-defendant Richard Ronald Nielson was 
charged by similar Information, also bearing Case No. 27644, filed 
March 13th, 1975. Though arraigned separately, these two cases 
were set for trial upon the same day. Defendant Nielson filed 
a motion, joined by appellant Dumas, seeking severance of the 
two cases for trial. Appellant resisted the joinder of the two 
cases and sought severance on the ground, inter alia that there 
was no statutory provision for joint trial of separately filed 
criminal cases. The objection to joinder and the motion to sever 
were overruled and denied, respectively, and the cases were tried 
together. 
The rulings of the trial court both in joining the two 
cases for trial and refusing to sever them upon motion of defen-
dants were in contravention of the statutes of the State of Utah 
and denied appellant due process. 
First is the fact there is_ no provision permitting joint 
trial of criminal defendants except Section 77-31-6 which provides: 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged 
with any offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court 
in its discretion on motion of the prosecuting 
attorney or any defendant orders separate trials. ... 
There is no statutory definition of the term "jointly charged"; but 
the phrase must be given its common meaning (77-21-26, U.C.A. 
19 53, as amended). Since multiple defendants can be charged 
jointly under a single Information, "jointly charged" must refer 
to that type of multiple-defendant Information. In this case, 
the County Attorney elected to file separate Informations on 
separate dates; hence, these individuals were not jointly charged. 
Therefore, Section 77-31-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, the only 
Utah provision permitting joint trial of two or more defendants, 
cannot be invoked, with the result that the act of the arraigning 
judge in setting these two cases for joint trial was erroneous 
and in contravention of law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing error, the matter was 
exascerbated by the trial court's failure to sever. Severance 
in Utah is vested squarely within the discretion of the trial 
judge, and who will not be reversed for failure to sever except 
where he has abused his discretion. State v. Lybert, 30 U.2d 
180, 515 P.2d 41 (1973). The question raised is "what is an 
abuse of discretion". The controlling case on that issue is 
State v. Rivenburgh, 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 wherein the court 
set forth this rule: 
When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense they shall be tried 
jointly, unless the court in its discretion 
orders separate trials. If the ruling of the 
court deprives the defendant of a fair triaT7 
then the trial has abused its discretion. 
The discretion may not be exercised arbitrar-
ily (emphasis added). ~ " " ~""~~~~ 
Since this rule uses the legal conclusion "fair trial" to define 
the legal conclusion "abuse of discretion," analysis of the facts 
of each case is necessary to determine whether it has been 
properly applied by the trial court* Though they are stated 
in the negative, the Rivenburgh case goes on to cite such factors 
as "inconsistent or antagonistic defenses, and hostility ... 
between the co-defendants, with each protesting his innocence 
in condeming the other"; cooperation between the jointly tried 
defendant's counsel; and propriety of instructions related to 
evidence admissible against one defendant but not the other as 
factors to be weighed in determining whether failure to sever 
has deprived due process in any given case. An analysis of these 
factors will demonstrate that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to order severance in this case. 
Here, the State adduced evidence that both George Dumas 
(out of the mouths of Haynes and DeLucia) and Richard Ronald 
Nielson (out of the mouth of Claude Aaron Parks) had accosted 
Haynes and DeLucia and attempted to rob them by use of a firearm. 
All the witnesses were, however, consistent in stating that only 
one individual held a weapon. As a result, the only way that 
Nielson (against whom no evidence was introduced related to his 
having participated in any other way) could defend himself was 
to support the testimony of those who said that George Dumas 
was the active assailent in the robbery. On the other hand, 
Dumas, in order to defend himself, had no alternative but to 
support the testimony indicating that Nielson had held the weapon 
as the first leg of his defense against having been both a direct 
participant and an aider and abettor. The net result was that 
the State after having adduced directly conflicting evidence, 
had nothing to do but sit back and watch the defendants distroy 
each other. The argument of the undersigned to the jury demon-
strates a distinct effort to convince the jury that Parks was 
telling the truth. Alternatively, the argument of counsel for 
Nielson at Vol.IV T.25-37 constitutes a valiant effort to demon-
strate that Parks was lying and that Dumas had the gun. This 
is not the kind of "different defense11 not found to be "incon-
sisten[t],f and ffantagonis [tic]ft in Rivenburgh, supra. The de-
fenses of appellant and Nielson were a direct and absolute con-
flict. Each of the defendants could be acquitted only if he 
succeeded in convicting the other. This antagonism was so clear 
that it made it unnecessary for the State to either Mfish or 
cut baitff in its argument to the jury as to which defendant had 
performed which acts. As a result of this inconsistency the 
State was permitted to merely lay back and let the jury fen 
for itself, secure in the knowledge that the trial would result 
in at least one conviction because of the defendants1 need to 
destroy each other. If our statute and constitutional guarantee 
of due process do not demand severance in this case they are for 
naught. The trial court's refusal to sever warrants a new trial. 
w • • > • .
 I V 
DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
LIMITATION OF DEFENDANT'S EFFORT TO REABILI-
TATE THE TESTIMONY OF CLAUDE AARON PARKS 
The State of Utah moved the Court to dismiss the charge 
of robbery against Claude Aaron Parks and to grant him immunity 
from prosecution for any acts committed by him in connection with 
the robbery (Vol.1 T.ll). The Court granted both motions (Vol.1 
T.13), ruling that the matter would not placed in front of the 
jury unless done so by the defense (Vol I. T.14). Counsel for 
co-defendant Nielson, on the cross-examination of Mr. Parks, made 
a significant point of calling the attention of the jury to the 
fact that Parks had asked for immunity in the case because he 
was concerned that if not granted immunity he would be convicted 
of robbery (Vol.1 T.47). The purpose of counsel's questioning 
is made obvious in his summation where he strongly implies that 
this grant of immunity was sufficient motive for Parks to have 
lied about the involvement of Richard Ronald Nielson in the robbery 
(Vol. IV T.24, 25 and 29). This argument was designed to strengthen 
the testimony of Haynes and DeLucia that appellant, not Nielson, 
had accosted them with a gun. 
Argument of this ilk has been recognized, approved 
and facilitated by the United States Supreme Court in Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 92 S.Ct. 763 
(1972) which contains the following language: 
Here the government's case depended almost 
entirely on Talaiento's testimony; without it 
there would have been no indictment and no evi- ' 
dence to carry the case to the jury. Talaiento's 
credibility as a witness was therefore an impor-
tant issue of the case, and evidence of any 
understanding or agreement as to a future 
prosecution would be relevant to his cred:T-
bility and the jury was entitled to know it 
(citing Napue v. Illinoisf 560 U.S. 264) fem-
phasis added] . ~" "~ 
Though the instant case does not contain the element 
of suppression upon which Giglio is based, the square holding 
of the Supreme Court that plea or dismissal information must 
be disclosed to the jury to insure proper evaluation of the 
credibility of the State's witnesses undoubtedly affected*the 
verdict in this case by forcing disclosure of Parks' dismissai 
by co-defendant's counsel. The Supreme Court has, since Giglio, 
had another occasion to treat this issue in DeMarco v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 449, 39 L.Ed.2d 501, 94 S.Ct. 1185, in which 
it remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the government had promised leniency to 
a co-defendant witness before he testified that no promise had 
been made to him with respect to the disposition of his case. 
The Supreme Court, Renquist, Burger and Powell dissenting on 
purely procedural grounds, remanded the case; restating the 
holding of Giglio that if the promise had proceeded the witness1 
testimony a new trial was warranted. The Supreme Court as pre-
sently constituted seems to be squarely behind the Giglio decision. 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have uniformly applied the holding of 
Giglio under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, see 
e.g. Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1932 (6th Cir. 1974) where 
an Ohio prosecutor deliberately mislead the jury with a summation 
statement that a key prosecution witness had nothing to gain 
by testifying, when the witness knew that his "chances" for an 
early probation hinged on his testifying against defendant at 
trial. There, as here, the witness1 expectations were deemed 
critical. 
In U.S. v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) ap-
pellant's co-defendant had negotiated a plea and received a 
sentence of two years probation without those facts having been 
disclosed to appellant. The Fifth Circuit reversed using the 
following language: 
The action of counsel for Osbrach and the 
government acquiesced in by the court was so 
prejudicial as to require a new trial. Being 
unaware of what occurred behind the closed doors 
of the courtroom, appellant had no way of com-
batting the damaging testimony elicited by the 
government from Osbrach. Faced with an appar-
ently hostile witness, defendant's counsel 
elected to forego examination of Osbrach. Under 
the circumstances the jury had no way of knowing 
what interest 'Osbrach had in testifying. We 
o o 
need not speculate on what effect knowledge 
of the secrete contingent agreement would have 
had on the jury"! The Supreme Court has made 
it clear that the failure of the government 
to disclose to the jury a plea bargaining nego-
tiation by a key witness deprives the defendant 
of constitutional due process [emphasis added]. 
Of further instruction is Berkholder v. State, 493 S.W. 2d 217 
(Tex.C.A. 1973) where, in a murder trial anagreement had been 
reached with co-defendant's lawyer that if he would testify 
against defendant without demanding immunity he would not be 
prosecuted (a transparent effort to evade Giglio). The lawyer 
told his client only that if he testified it would "help him.11 
The Texas court held: 
One reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
Whitehurst's actions (in denying knowledge 
of the deal in a qualified way) is that he 
knew of the State's plan to not prosecute, 
but also knew not to mention it for failure 
of jeopardizing the entire scheme. Whether 
or not this is true is not for us to decide. 
The point is that the jury should have been 
given an opportunity to judge Whitehurst's 
credibility for themselves. The trial court's 
refusal to require the disclosure of the " 
State's plan not to prosecute Whitehurst de-
prived the jury of that function. 
In the instant case counsel for Nielson properly invoked 
Giglio and effected disclosure of Parks' dismissal to the jury, 
making considerable hay of it in argument. This was proper. 
The error here was that the jury was never informed that parks 
was a federal parolee from Leavenworth Penitentiary and that 
by admitting his complicity in the robbery on the witness stand 
he was admitting a parol violation fully expecting that the 
result would be his prompt return to prison. The efforts of 
appellant's counsel to inform the jury of these facts result 
in the following (Vol.Ill T.X17-119): 
Q. [By Mr. Barber] Now, Mr. Parks there 
has been evidence adduced in this trial 
on stipulation that you received a grant 
of immunity in exchange for your testimony, 
correct? 
A, [By Mr. Parks] Yes. 
Q. And you understand by that, that you won't 
be prosecuted by the State of Utah? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Despite that, do you have an opinion about 
whether your having given the testimony 
you have given at this trial will result 
in your imprisonment? 
A. Do I have an opinion? 
Q. Yes. 
MR. KELLER: Well, Your Honor, I object 
to that. I just don't understand. For 
one thing, if we are going to talk about 
opinions, we need foundations. Mr. Parks 
has already testified that he got immunity. 
We stipulated to that. I am not sure what 
Mr. Barber is trying to gain by a question 
like that. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Barber) Well, State immunity, 
Mr. Parks, results in your just being able 
to walk away from this affair and not be 
returned to prison? 
MR. KELLER: Same objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. BARBER: Your Honor, I think this is 
proper under Gi'glio. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR BARBER: The facts about his expectation 
as a result of his testimony are clearly 
relevant. There has been testimony going 
one way and I think I am entitled to testify 
going the other way. 
THE COURT: I sustained the objection. 
If he has any knowledge, you can ask him, 
but I am not going to permit speculative 
questions in that area. 
Q. (By Mr. Barber) Do you know, Mr. Parks, 
whether any other legal action will be 
taken? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Q. You don't. All right, that is all I have. 
If disclosure of a governmental proffer of immunity 
to a witness is deemed by the United States Supreme Court to be 
critical to due process presumably because of its power to tempt 
false testimony for personal gain, how can it be said that infor-
mation that the state proffer will not forestall the disaster 
of a prison sentence likely to be imposed as a direct result 
of the witnessy testimony be said to be any less critical to due 
process? How can a jury fairly assess a witness1 "probable motive 
or lack thereof to testify [as he has]11 absent knowledge that 
the substantial motive to lie shown at trial really amounts to 
nothing to the witness? It cannot: for our jury system has 
validity as a fact-finding institution only so long as we care-
fully guard its right to all information reasonably relevant 
to a fair resolution of the facts. Whatever finding of fact the 
jury in this case made about who wielded the weapon on Feburary 
19, 1975 is invalid because made without teh benefit of relevant 
information of overwhelming importance• All appellant asks is 
for a new trial at which the jury is given a fair "opportunity 
to judge [Parks1] credibility for themselves."• The Supreme Court 
of the United States has said that due process demands as much 
and this Court should secure that guarantee to the citizens of 
Utah. 
V 
THE INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN QUASHED FOR 
FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT 
BILL OF PARTICULARS AND FOR PROSECUTORIAL MIS-
CONDUCT RELATED TO DISCOVERY WHICH DENIED DUE 
PROCESS AND THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. On April 9th, 1975 appellant filed a Motion for 
Bill of Particulars requesting the court to order the State to 
disclose "the particular acts allegedly performed by George 0. 
Dumas which constitute the crime of robbery as charged." This 
motion, together with a similar motion filed by co-defendant 
Nielson was denied on May 5th, 1975. The denial of the motion 
for these particulars was reversible error. 
Section 77-21-9,.Utah Code Annot. 1953, as amended, 
provides that if the Information "fails to inform the defendant 
of the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to 
prepare his defense, or to give him such information as he is 
entitled to under the Constitution of [Utah]11 he is entitled to 
a Bill of Particulars containing "such information as may be 
necessary for these purposes/' The governing constitutional 
principle is found in Article I Section 12 of the Constitution 
of Utah which provides that "the accused shall have the right 
to ... demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him 
...
ft
. It is obvious that the "cause" of an accusation against 
an individual is normally his performance of some act which con-
stitutes a crime. 
This Court has given us some guidance as to the infor-
mation to which criminal defendants are entitled. In State v. 
Robbins, 101 U. 119, 127 P.2d 1042, defendant appealed a robbery 
conviction on the grounds that the Information filed against him 
was inadequate to charge the offense of robbery because it did 
not specify that the theft had been accomplished by force or fear. 
In sustaining appellant's conviction the court said: 
No question could have been in the mind of 
Robbins as to the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him. But if he were in doubt 
the law provides that he may demand the nature 
and cause of the action against him. The 
alleged fact or facts which the State proposes 
to prove may be secured by demanding a Bill 
of Particulars (12 7 P.2d at l04j [emphasis 
added]. 
In State v. Soloman, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1938) the court indi-
cated that "the granting of a Bill of Particulars" is not discre-
tionary with the court as it was at common law, but is a right 
which the defendant can demand and which the court must grant 
if the statutory conditions are met.
 ; 
Because of the manifested tendencies of defense counsel 
to abuse the right to a Bill of Particulars and to seek by that 
means to obtain a preview of the State's evidence against their 
clients, this court has clearly said that matters of mere evidence 
are not discoverable by way of a Bill of Particulars; lit State 
v. Lack, 221 P. 2d 852 (1950) the defendant was charged with em-
bezzlement from a State liquor store. He sought, by Bill of 
Particulars, to obtain copies of invoices, delivery sheets, ledger 
sheets, vendor reports, and other matters which this court character 
ized as "evidentiary". In sustaining the trial court's refusal 
to order these matters disclosed by Bills of Particulars, the 
court said: 
..."The Bill of Particulars need not plead 
matters of evidence." Section-105-21-9(1) U.C.A. 
1943 was designed to enable a defendant to 
have stated the particulars of the charge which 
he must meet, where the short form indictment 
or information is used. It was not intended 
as a device to compel the prosecution to give 
an accused person a preview of the evidence 
on which the state relies to sustain the charge. 
Recent pronouncements of this Court have done nothing to alter these 
early guidelines. State v. Moraine
 f 25 U.2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 
merely holds that a statement of a witness used against the defen-
dant is the kind of "evidentiary" material which need not be 
provided by the Bill of Particulars. Similarly, State v. Lauder, 
25 U.2d 418, 483 P.2d 887 holds that failure to require disclosure 
of a statement by a witness which was never used at trial, and 
of which defendant was already aware was not reversible error. 
Furthermore, the court found that the defendants in both of these 
cases had waived their right to the Bill by either failing to 
object to the challenged testimony or to ask for a continuance 
in order to prepare the case for defense where defendant felt 
that the Bills provided was inadequate. 
There remains then only one question: Are the "par-
ticular acts performed by [defendant] which constitute the crime 
of robbery" evidentiary facts or the "particulars of the offense11? 
Appellant contends that the answer is obvious• All the language 
of the Motion for Bill of Particulars asks for is a description 
of the acts allegedly performed which constitute the crime of 
robbery. It does not ask for disclosure of the means or methods 
by which State intends to prove that appellant performed those 
acts. It does not, like the Bills discussed in Meringue and 
Lauder, ask for disclosure of statements of witnesses; neither 
does it ask for the disclosure of documentary or any other kind 
of evidence as did the motion in Lack. This motion asked for 
precisely what *this Court has said defendants are entitled to 
*
n R
°kbins. Section 76-2-202, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, can make 
one a principal in a criminal endeavor for all sorts of different 
conduct. In this case, the State urged the jury to convict on 
two theories, each supported by altogether different proofs. 
Without knowing that the State intended to proceed on a contra-
dictory basis, appellant's ability to properly defend this case 
was substantially impaired. Thus, the failure of the trial court 
to-order the particulars demanded was reversible error. 
B. On" May 5th, 1975 defendant Nielson asked, by Motion 
for Bill of Particulars for a list of the witnesses ..to. be called 
at trial. Appellant did not file an independent motion for this 
information because of his knowledge that once the material had 
been disclosed to defendant Nielson he would have equal access 
to the information. Thus he merely joined in Nielson's motion 
for disclosure of the names of witnesses. On May 5th, 1975 the : 
Honorable Bryant Croft ordered the State o£ Utah to provide de-
fendants with the names and addresses of all witnesses to be called 
at trial. This Order is reflected by marginal notations on the 
Motion for Bill of Particulars filed by Nielson. On May 30th, 
1975 the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney filed a list 
of witnesses to be called at trial which showed the address of 
Robert Allen Haynes and Richard DeLucia, the State's chief wit-
nesses in the case, to be f,c/o J.L. Johnson, SLPD". It is manifest 
that J.L.Johnson is not the address of Robert Allen Haynes and 
Richard DeLucia, both of whom are residents of the City of New 
York. On June 9th, 19 75 appellant filed a Motion to Quash based 
on the failure of the State to file an adequate Bill of Particulars 
as it related to the names and addresses of witnesses. That Motion 
contains a long and tortured recitation of the efforts of appel-
lant's counsel to contact and interview two of the three eye 
witnesses to the offense prior to trial. The best that could 
be done was a brief telephone conversation on the day preceding 
trial which left insufficient time to verify or check out the 
information given by the witnesses in that interview. 
The courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to de-
fendants need for access to witnesses and evidence prior to trial 
in order to secure proper defense. This awareness has been sup-
ported by the Supreme Court of the United States in such decisions 
as Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 
(1963). The legal profession has also recognized this defense 
need and has manifest its position in the ABA Standards related 
to the administration of criminal justice. Section 3.11 thereof 
states: 
DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTOR 
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a 
prosecutor to fail to make timely disclosure 
to the defense of the existence of evidence, 
known to him, supporting the innocence of the 
defendant. He should disclose evidence which 
would tend to negate the guilt of the accused 
or mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce 
the punishment at the earliest feasible oppor-
tunity. 
(b) The prosecutor should comply in good 
faith with the discovery procedures under applic-
able law\ 
(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a 
prosecutor intentionally to avoid pursuit of 
evidence because he believes it will damage 
the prosecution's case or the accused. 
In a redundant citation to this Court of what the law is in some 
jurisdictions and what it ought to be in all jurisdictions, 
attention is again called to State V. Gregory, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966). There, defendant was charged with a capital offense. 
The federal statute required that a list of names of witnesses 
be furnished to defendant no later than two days prior to trial. 
The prosecutor apparently provided the names and addresses of 
the witnesses, and though he did not instruct them not to talk 
to defense counsel, he did advise them not to talk to anyone 
unless he was present. The witnesses refused to be interviewed 
by defense counsel. In reversing the appellant1s conviction 
the D.C. Circuit Court held: 
... Witnesses, particularly eye witnesses to 
a crime are the property of neither the prose-
cution nor the defense. Both sides have an 
equal right, and should have an equal opportunity 
to interview them. Here the defendant was denied 
that opportunity which, not only the statute, 
but elemental fairness and due process required 
that he have ... 
A criminal trial, like its civil counter-
part, is a quest for truth. That quest will 
more often be successful if both sides have 
an equal opportunity to interview the persons 
who have the information from which the truth 
may be determined. The current tendency in 
the criminal law is in the direction of discovery 
of the facts before trial and elimination of 
surprise at trial. A related development in 
the criminal law is the requirement of the 
prosecution not frustrate the defense in the 
preparation of its case. Information favorable 
to the defense must be made available to the 
defense (citing Brady). Reversal of convictions 
for suppression o£ such evidence, and even for 
mere failure to disclose, have become common 
place. It is not suggested here that there 
was any direct suppression of evidence. But 
there was unquestionably a suppression of means 
by which the defense could obtain "evidence. 
The defendant could not know what the eye witness 
to the events in suit would testify to or how 
firm they were in their testimony unless defense 
counsel was provided a fair opportunity for 
interview. In our judgment the prosecutor's 
advice to those eye witnesses frustrated that 
effort and denied appellant a fair trial [emphasis 
added] . 
Just as in Gregory, the Salt Lake County Attorney in this case 
"frustrated" defendant's effort to interview two critical wit-
nesses prior to trial. That frustration substantially penalized 
appellant's efforts to probe the testimony of those eye witnesses 
that appellant held the weapon during the robbery and to explore 
the possibility that their statements to that effect were in 
error and that the contrary testimony of Parks was more accurate. 
The list of witnesses supplied by the State is far from a "good 
faith11 effort to comply with a lawful order of the trial court. 
The prosecutor's action denied and frustrated due process. 
Question: Why is it that prosecutors in this State 
persist in frustrating defense efforts at discovery at the expense 
of speed and dispatch in trials of criminal causes themselves 
and ofttimes at the expense of fundamental fairness? 
Answer: This Court does not require them to do other-
w i s e . ;"•'• • 
Appellant urges this Court to adopt the rule of Gregory 
and to direct prosecutors to comply with the ABA Standards related 
to the administration of criminal justice as they apply to the 
disclosure of evidence; and to do so by reversing this case and 
remanding it for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, appellant prays this Court 
to enter its Order reversing its conviction and either quashing 
the information against him or remanding the case to the District 
Court for new trial. 
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